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Chapter 1 — Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate and attempt to understand some ways
in which humor and comedy operate with the particular goal of showing how incongruity
theory explains why people find certain types of situations or experiences amusing. Many
others writing on the philosophy of humor have remarked on the seemingly
insurmountable difficulty of producing a comprehensive theory of humor. The sheer
number and variety of situations capable of precipitating amusement has, throughout
history, rendered every attempt at a formulating a foundational theory of humor
ultimately unsuccessful; some are too austere and fail to account for the wide range of
humorous situations while others are far too broad, allowing non-humorous situations to
meet their criteria for the presence of humor.
Given the apparent elusiveness of the fundamental nature of humor, this thesis is
not in the business of asserting a fundamental theory of comedy. Rather, I will present a
popular and fairly successful account of humor most commonly referred to as incongruity
theory. I will examine the strengths of this account according to a modern formulation of
incongruity theory as well as formulations set forth by Kant and Schopenhauer in the
18th and 19th centuries. I will show that incongruity theory provides a relatively reliable
framework for analyzing humor in spite of several important criticisms I will level
against it. Finally, I will examine the relationship between humor as described by
incongruity theory, reason, and the brand of philosophical absurdity identified by Thomas
Nagel (1972). By applying incongruity theory to foundational yet persistently
unanswerable metaphysical questions about existence, death, God, etc., I will show that
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humor not only bears a close relationship to these issues but that humor also serves as a
means by which we can engage and cope with the unsolvable nature of these problems.
Though humor and comedy have historically received relatively little attention as
areas of philosophical study, the existing body of work addressing them is promising and
warrants further investigation; humans, after all, spend a great deal of time and money in
search of amusement. The relationship between laughter and the perception of humor,
however, is less straightforward than many historical theories of humor seem account for.
We laugh when we perceive humor, to be certain. But we laugh just as readily out of
nervousness, relief, scorn, intoxication, etc. By conflating theories of humor with theories
of laughter, many philosophers have unnecessarily complicated, and in some cases fatally
damaged, their work. It is plain to see that there are many cases in which a person can
perceive humor and be amused by it without laughing. Conversely, there are many cases
in which laughter is not caused by experiencing something funny. It is very likely that
strong and interesting connections exist between laughter of all types (humorous and nonhumorous alike), but attempting to understand humor by working backwards from
laughter to the thing that causes laughter is doomed to fail; the situations and events that
precipitate non-humorous laughter are simply too numerous and varied to account for. To
this point, consider how inefficient it would seem to make an inquiry into the nature of
sadness by first trying to explain what types of things make us cry.
Incongruity theory, in many cases, is presented as a theory of laughter. As a
matter of fact, it is capable of explaining laughter as a reaction to a variety of situations,
humorous and otherwise. Nonetheless, it is my contention that there is very little to be
gained from attempting to provide a single theory to explain all instances of laughter.
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Given that humor— as opposed to laughter—is the domain of this paper, I have modified
incongruity theory from an explanation of human laughter into theory that explains (a)
why certain things have the potential to be funny and (b) why people find certain things
funny. For the sake of concision and clarity, from here forward any mention of laughter
(unless otherwise noted) should be taken as a reference to the physical expression of
amusement resulting from the perception of humor.
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Chapter 2 - Incongruity Theory
The term 'incongruity theory' refers to a group of philosophical accounts of humor
that posit the perception of incongruity as the source of amusement. Though it is not
entirely flawless, incongruity theory stands as one of the most prominent accounts of
amusement in the contemporary discussion of philosophy of humor. Incongruity theory
operates in two ways. First, and most importantly, it explains why people react with
laughter in a very wide range of situations (including, as mentioned in the introduction,
some which are not funny). In other words, incongruity theory provides an explanation
for why humans find certain things funny. Second, it provides an explanation of what
makes a situation itself funny. This explanatory versatility is an attractive feature of
incongruity theory. In this chapter, I will provide a rough sketch of incongruity theory
and then complicate it to provide a more nuanced and accurate account. Incongruity
theory essentially posits that people feel amused when they have an experience that
violates the normal order of things according to their own subjective understanding of
what the normal order of things is. Incongruity theory relies on the premise that in their
daily lives (that is, outside the philosophy seminar room), most people believe that the
world is ordered; they believe that objects behave and interact with other objects in a
consistent manner, that actions have consistent results. We perceive humor and are
amused, according to incongruity theory, when we are presented with an experience that
is incongruous with what we understand to be the normal order of things. A politician's
pants falling down as he is receiving an award; the village drunk saving the day
accidentally and only in virtue of his inebriation; uttering a double entendre and having
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the accidental meaning taken seriously as the intended meaning, are all examples of
funny violations of the normal order of things. These violations can also include
disruptions of causal chains and the flawed use of logic (many jokes, in fact, can be
boiled down to elaborate examples of logical fallacies). Other times, we are amused
simply by people behaving in ways that are incongruous with their title or position in
society like the infamous photo of George W. Bush in a flight-suit or a monkey wearing a
tuxedo.
It is important to make clear that incongruity theory is a subject-dependent theory
of humor. Different people have different understandings of what constitutes the 'normal
order', so an experience that seems humorously incongruous to one person might not
seem so funny to another. Though incongruity theory explains that the presence of an
incongruity gives a situation the potential to be amusing, funniness is a property that is
perceived subjectively. If a person perceives an incongruity, they may find that
incongruity amusing. A different subject, however, might not find that same situation
incongruous, and therefore would likely not be amused. This accounts for different senses
of humor across cultural backgrounds, education, religious beliefs, etc.

What is an Incongruity?
If we are to seriously consider incongruity theory's potential to explain humor, we
must understand what exactly is being referred to by the word "incongruity". John
Morreall (2011) and Robert Latta (1999) among others have pointed out that many
incongruity theories are plagued by confusion and disagreement over the use of the terms
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'incongruity' and 'incongruous'. In order to avoid such pitfalls, we ought to spell out a
careful definition of the type of incongruity for which incongruity theory is named.
It is exceedingly tempting to attempt to define an incongruous situation or
occurrence by reference to words with meanings that are closely related to incongruity
but have slightly different connotations. Terms like 'absurd', 'illogical', 'out of context',
'unexpected', 'ludicrous', 'ridiculous', or 'inappropriate' are often invoked to describe a
humorous incongruity, but they are ultimately inaccurate and unwieldy (Morreall,
"Comic Relief", loc. 405). That is not to say that a humorous incongruity cannot be
absurd or illogical, in fact many are, but what is meant by incongruity in the context of a
discussion of humor is better described as a mismatch between a subject's conceptual
understanding of how an action ought to happen, an event ought to unfold, or an object
ought to appear, and a particular experience that contradicts this conceptual
understanding. John Morreall (2011) describes the fundamental meaning of "incongruity"
as it is used in incongruity theories as what occurs when, "some thing or event we
perceive or think about violates our normal mental patterns and normal expectations."
(Loc. 405). It is not quite right to describe an incongruity simply as something
"unexpected". Rather, the incongruous object or event must clash with the systems of
thought we use to generate expectations about the outcomes of our and others' actions.
These systems can be understood as conceptual patterns used to organize, synthesize, and
understand our experiences.
These conceptual patterns develop in response to our interactions with our
material and social environment. Informed by experience, they are the mechanism by
which we are able to constantly form accurate expectations about the future. These
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expectations, in turn, guide our actions. More often than not, such thought patterns work
remarkably well—so well, in fact, that we hardly notice them. I expect to feel heat if I
extend my bare hand towards a campfire; when passing an oncoming stranger on the
sidewalk, I expect that they will simply stroll past me, not suddenly extend their leg to
trip me; when watching a cheesy romantic comedy it is reasonable for me to expect,
based on my previous experiences with the genre, that the 'nice guy' will get the girl.
These relatively simple examples serve to illustrate the principle, but it is important to
emphasize the complexity and sophistication of these processes. Many of our conceptual
patterns overlap and interact with each other. Furthermore, these conceptual patterns are
constantly synthesizing incredible amounts of sensory data and accounting for countless
variables. In the course of any given conversation, for instance, we form expectations for
the progression of the interaction based on innumerable factors such as previous
conversations, body language, tone of voice, knowledge about the person we are talking
with, conversations we've had with people who seem similar to the person we're talking
with, and myriad others. Some conceptual patterns are more reliable than others, but for
the most part they provide us with a highly reliable framework for interacting with our
environment. An incongruous event or object disrupts these ordinarily reliable conceptual
patterns. This disruption, when combined with some other conditions, is liable to amuse
us. These other conditions, of course, are extremely important in terms of human
perception of humor. A conceptual incongruity itself is not sufficient for amusement. If,
for example, I reach towards a fire and feel cold, I most likely won’t be amused. I will
examine the other necessary conditions for amusement much more closely in the coming
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pages but first I would like to dwell for a moment on incongruity itself and its function in
the amusement-reaction as a necessary condition for our perception of humor.

Incongruity Theory at Work
Before diving into an in-depth analysis of incongruity theory, let's illustrate the
account by showing how it can explain the funniness of a handful of short jokes. Here's
an old standby that strikes me as pretty amusing.
An 80 year-old man goes into the confessional and tells the priest,
"Father, I am an 80 year-old man, I'm married, I have 4 children and 11
grandchildren. Last night I strayed and had an affair with two beautiful 23
year-old girls. We partied and made love all night long."
The priest says, "This is very serious, my son. When was the last
time you were at confession?"
The old man says, "Well, Father, I'm Jewish. So I've never been to
confession before."
The priest says, "You're Jewish? Then why are you here telling me
this?"
"I'm telling everyone!"
It's relatively straightforward to see how incongruity theory explains why many people
find this joke amusing. In the West, at least, there are certain widely-held conceptual
patterns governing the understanding of the institution of marriage and the sanctity and
sobriety of the confessional as a religious space. We also understand the stereotypical
sexual appeal of two beautiful young women to an old man who is long past his sexual
peak. What this joke does, however, is show how the old man has, according to the norms
of western society, incorrectly ordered the importance of sexual desire, religious
austerity, and the sanctity of his marriage. The carelessness and glee with which he cheats
on his wife strikes those of us who find this joke funny as incongruous. Furthermore, the
old man's wildly inappropriate decision to use a sacred occasion like confession to brag
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about his sexual conquests is incongruous in virtue of the very nature of Catholic
confession, an institution commonly associated with sincerity, guilt, and forgiveness.
Finally, and perhaps most amusingly, is the incongruity between our conceptual
understanding of the confessional as a place that is absolutely private and personal and
the old man's use of it as just another place to "tell everybody".
In simpler jokes, the incongruities at play are even more straight forward
and easily visible. This pun, for instance: At a nudist colony for communists, two
gentlemen are sitting naked on the porch. One turns to the other and says, "I say
old boy, have you read Marx?" To which his comrade replies, "Yes... I think it's
these wicker chairs." (Keillor, 28). This joke, like almost all puns, simply trades
on a miscommunication in which one meaning of a homophone is intended by the
speaker but a different meaning is heard. This kind of miscommunication is easily
understood as a semantic incongruity. The audience, along with the first
communist in the joke is under the impression that the second communist's
answer will be something about Marx or political theory in general. His response
about wicker chairs, however, is incongruous in light of the intended meaning of
the question.
Here is one more example of joke that exploits a relatively straightforward
humorous incongruity:
This guy walks into a pub, sits down, and says, “Give me two beers, I've had a
rough day at work.”
The bartender says, “Sorry to hear that, what do you do?”
The guy says, “I take care of the corgis— you know, the dogs the royal
family owns.”
The bartender says, “Tough job, huh?”
The guy says, “Well, all that inbreeding has led to low intelligence and
bad temperament. And the dogs aren’t that smart either.”
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(Keillor, 157)
This joke operates by exploiting the differences between the linguistic
conventions we use to talk about people and those we use to talk about dogs. In many
cases using the terms "inbreeding", "low intelligence", and "bad temperament" to
describe a family of dogs is perfectly acceptable. However, we don't ordinarily use this
type of language in reference to a family of humans (let alone the royal family). By using
dog breeding terms to describe a family (even if the family is being accurately described),
the dog breeder in this joke presents a humorous incongruity to the bartender and to the
audience of the joke.
In some cases, however, there are many layers of incongruity at play. It is
particularly difficult to parse jokes that contain incongruities relative to several
conceptual patterns. This (by now) classic joke about a small-town rabbi, for example,
contains incongruities strictly within its story as well as incongruities between events
described in the story and the normal order of things in real life. This version of the joke
is taken from Ted Cohen (1999):
After many days of hard, continuous rain, the river is in danger of flooding, and
word goes out that people may have to abandon their homes. When the river
crests, water pours through the town, inundating houses, and it continues to rise.
Firemen are sent in a small motorboat to go through the streets to make sure
everyone is leaving. When they come to the house of the rabbi, they find him
standing knee-deep in water on his front porch.
“Come on, Rabbi,” say the firemen. “The river will go much higher, and
you should leave with us.”
“No,” says the rabbi. “God will protect me.”
And he sends them away. The river rises higher, the rabbi is forced to go
up to the second floor of his house, and now the police come in a motor launch.
“Come on, Rabbi,” say the police, “there isn’t much time.”
“No,” insists the rabbi. “I will stay right here. God will look after me.”
And he sends them away. Now the river rises so high that the rabbi is forced to
stand on the roof of his house. When the National Guard arrive in a large boat,
telling him that the river is sure to go even higher, the rabbi says, “All my life I
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have been a man of faith, and I will stay now, and trust in God,” and sends them
away.
The river rises, the rabbi is swept away, and the rabbi drowns. Forthwith
the rabbi appears in heaven, where he angrily approaches the throne of God,
demanding, “How can You have let this happen to me? For all my life I have kept
Your mitzvot. I have done what You asked, and trusted in You. Why?”
A voice sounds from the throne: “You shmuck, I sent three boats!” (20)
If we find this story funny, we do so, according to incongruity theory, in virtue of
a discrepancy between the behavior of the characters as described in the joke and our
conceptually produced expectations for how those characters ought to behave. Note that
the joke's set up is written in such a way as to imitate the affect and cadence of the
religious parables with which Western audiences are so familiar. It features a small town,
a dramatic and unanticipated weather event, and spiritual leader who is willing to
sacrifice his life to prove his faith; were it not for the punch-line, this joke would read as
the beginning of a perfectly serious religious story. As the joke is told, the audience
develops an expectation for its ending based on their previous story-hearing experiences.
This process leads us to expect that upon the rabbi's arrival in heaven God will reward
him for his faith or offer a piece of divine wisdom. Instead, we are given a description of
God calling a lifelong spiritual devotee a "schmuck". This depiction clashes with our
normal way of thinking about God and this incongruity, in turn, is amusing.
There is, however, a deeper incongruity at play. The joke would still be funny if
the "schmuck" line were cut. Many of us familiar with the mythology of the JudeoChristian tradition have come to associate the omnipotence of God with supernatural acts.
We understand divine intervention to be marked (as it is in many religious texts) by
unexplainable phenomena; boats and firefighters are not sent by God, we think, they are
sent by EMS dispatch—acts of God are never so mundane. The incongruity between the
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water-into-wine, burning-bush style miracles we've learned to expect from holy
interventions and the lackluster but ultimately more practical deliverance offered by God
in the story, is at the core of what we find amusing about this joke. The audience that
finds this joke amusing does so not because the punch-line is simply unexpected or
absurd, but because what is delivered in the punch-line violates a conceptual pattern with
which the audience is familiar. The humorous effect of this tension is compound by the
rabbi's character, whose funniness derives from his embodiment of the incongruity noted
above; he is a deeply faithful man, but his conceptual understanding of the way God
ought to act prevents him from being able to recognize the act of God unfolding right
before his eyes.
In this respect, incongruity theory can present a slightly tricky analytical
challenge. For any given instance of amusement—after hearing the rabbi joke, for
example—we are presented with the problem of identifying, from a number of potentially
humorous incongruities, the incongruity responsible for amusing us. Is the incongruity
simply contained within the joke, between what happens in the joke and what ordinarily
happens in situations akin to the joke's set up? Is it between what actually happens and
what the audience expects will happen? Or does the joke bring out some incongruity in
the audiences own beliefs about how God might act—why couldn't, for example, the
arrival of the three boats be taken as proof of God's existence? Answering this particular
question can be very difficult, particularly because the answer seems to be that it is a
combination of some kind.
In some cases of amusement, the humorous incongruity is easy to spot. Puns, for
instance, often play on clear and simple linguistic incongruities between the way a certain
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word or term is usually used in a certain context and a different connotation of the same
word/phrase or a homophone. For instance, "I'm terribly afraid of escalators, so I'm
taking steps to avoid them". The incongruity at play in this quip is quite simple and easily
recognizable. When we talk about "taking steps to avoid a problem" we tend to assume
that we are taking about a plan of action used to steer clear of whatever it is that we want
to avoid. In this case, however, "taking steps" refers literally to walking up a set of stairs
to avoid engaging with something the speaker is afraid of, namely, escalators.
Nonetheless, jokes like the rabbi joke that draw out an incongruity between a relatively
unquestioned belief held by the audience and the possibility that that belief is unfounded
seem to strike us as the most funny, insightful, and brilliant jokes out there; reflecting on
this joke prompts us to wonder if maybe we should be seeing acts of God everywhere in
our daily lives. And, like the rabbi joke, these are the jokes that tend to get told over and
over again. I will address this contention in much greater detail in Chapter 5.

Repeated Amusement
Some will surely object, however, that even though the rabbi joke is set up to
imitate a non-funny story, anyone hearing it will surely know from the outset that they
are listening to a joke. If this is true, how can we be amused by the incongruity; if
incongruity theory is true, shouldn't any joke's funniness be neutralized by the audience
knowing that they are hearing a joke? This point, which is important and certainly worth
considering, is ultimately untenable. If we know that we are being told a joke, we can
nonetheless appreciate the joke's funniness by recognizing that it still violates conceptual
patterns. Even if we anticipate a violation of these conceptual patterns, the violation and
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the incongruity presented by the violation, can still be funny. To feel amused, it is not
necessary that we be surprised by an incongruity, an incongruity must simply be present.
The presence of an incongruity gives a situation or event the potential to amuse, the
perception of an incongruity in certain contexts causes us to feel amused. For this reason
it is important to emphasize that humorous incongruities do not simply consist in ‘the
unexpected’. To the contrary, we are often amused while explicitly holding the
expectation that we will be amused. No one goes to a comedy club expecting to hear a
series of short, serious stories, for instance (although, as I will show in the coming
paragraphs, such an experience might amuse us), and we often preface joke-telling by
announcing our intentions. We expect to be amused in these situations, and therefore,
whether we realize it or not, expect to be presented with a story that is humorously
incongruous. We are often amused at times when we expect to be amused. Surprise,
therefore, is not a necessary condition of amusement (although it often seems to help). It
is, rather, recognizing that a conceptual pattern has been or is being violated that amuses
us.
The fact that we need only recognize a conceptual violation—rather than being
surprised by a conceptual violation—in order to be amused serves to explain why we can
find the same thing funny more than once. Though we never seem to find a joke as funny
as when we first heard it (independent of the objective potential funniness of the joke),
we nonetheless find ourselves constantly amused by jokes, movies, episodes of TV
shows, etc. that we've experienced time and time again. This is possible because we
recognize the violation of a conceptual pattern even if we already know how and when it
will be violated. If you hear a joke you've already heard, you can still appreciate that it is
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funny and be (at least somewhat) amused by it because the incongruity between the
action in the joke and a given conceptual pattern is still present. However, as is the case
with all experiences, repeated exposure to jokes both fresh and familiar leads us to
develop certain conceptual patterns for understanding and appreciating humor. We
become less and less impressed with "simple" or "silly" jokes because they slowly stop
presenting a dramatic enough break with our conceptual patterns (consider how the form
of the generic knock-knock joke has become, for the most part, too familiar to amuse us
in any significant sense). While this dynamic has lead to increasingly elegant and clever
jokes structured in conventional ways (e.g. a woman walks into a bar and orders a
double entendre, so the bartender gives it to her), it also has engendered a host of jokes
and comedic styles that use violations of the conceptual patterns governing joke-hearing
to generate amusement (sticking with the knock-knock theme, consider the ubiquitous
'interrupting cow' variation). This latter category of jokes might accurately be considered
metahumor, as they are often jokes about jokes or jokes about the structure of jokes.

Metahumor: Jokes About Jokes, Anti-Jokes, Shaggy Dog Stories
Incongruity theory is appealing as a theory of humor in virtue of its ability to
explain why audiences, especially contemporary audiences, are so amused by jokes that
violate the conventions of traditional joke-telling. This kind of humor can work in a
number of ways. Some of these jokes violate our normal conceptual patterns by adhering
to standard joke structure—thereby leading an audience familiar with joke-telling to
expect a certain kind of disruption to their normal conceptual patterns in the punch-line—
but then delivering a punch-line that doesn't, in any context other than the joke, disrupt
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the audience's normal conceptual patterns. These jokes are sometimes called 'anti-jokes'.
Many such jokes are childish and are often circulated by young people who have fairly
recently become accustomed to the standard patterns used in joke construction ("what's
the difference between...", "What do you call a...", "Knock, knock...", "A man walks into
a bar...", "How many x does it take to change a light bulb?" etc.). Take this joke, which
was quite popular in my 5th grade class, for instance. "What's brown and sticky? A stick."
The punch-line here isn't a clever pun, it isn't a double-entendre, it doesn't violate our
normal conceptual patterns in any significant sense except for the conceptual pattern we
have associated with jokes that start with questions like "what's brown and sticky?" The
punch-line, in fact, is funny only because it is a perfectly literal and painfully obvious
answer to the question posed in the set up; it is incongruous because the audience often
expects, based on the normal conceptual patterns associated with joke-telling, an
unexpected twist in the punch-line. It turns out, of course, that an unexpected twist is
delivered, it's just that it is unexpected in an unexpected way, so to speak. Consider some
other examples from the schoolyard: "Why did the monkey fall out of the tree? Because it
was dead. Why did the second monkey fall out of the tree? Because it was tied to the first
one." Or, "When geese fly in V formation, why is one side is always longer than the
other? Because that side has more geese on it." Once again, these punch-lines are only
funny because they are so obviously not the kind of statements that ordinarily constitute
punch-lines. Furthermore, and more importantly, the punch-lines in these jokes do not
bear the kind of relationship to their set-ups that our normal conceptual patterns instruct
us to expect between set-ups and punch-lines. In these cases, we perceive funniness
because we recognize the relationship between punch-line and set-up as incongruous in
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virtue of conventional joke-telling practice. This, as opposed to more traditional cases in
which the incongruity is between the joke itself and the conceptual patterns we have
concerning some activity, object or event described in the joke. Here are some more
widely circulated examples of jokes that play on the conventions of the "a man walks into
a bar" formula: A priest, a rabbi, and Buddhist monk walk into a bar, the bartender looks
up and says "what is this, some kind of joke?"; an Irishman walks past a bar; a man
walks into a bar and says "ouch"; two men walk into a bar, the third one ducks; A blind
man walks into a bar. And a table. And a chair; etc.
The 'anti' element of such anti-jokes can be pushed to the extreme for a somewhat
different kind of humorous effect. For example, "What's worse than finding a worm in
your apple...? The Holocaust." Though it is certainly in worse taste, this joke is somewhat
similar structure to the stick joke above, but it also incorporates a categorical incongruity
based on the way we qualify different levels of misfortune. The punch-line could easily
be, "finding two worms in your apple" (which would put it in the same category as the
stick joke and the geese joke), but by making the punch-line something so incalculably
worse than a worm-ridden apple, the joke presents, in addition to the kind of incongruity
presented by the stick and geese jokes, an incongruity between degrees of badness (of
course the Holocaust is worse than finding a worm in your apple!). Furthermore, upon
hearing the punch-line, the audience realizes that the answer could be any atrocity (e.g.
"murder", "genocide", "the Bosnian civil war", "9/11", etc.); the punch-line only relates
to the set up in the somewhat tenuous sense that both the set up and punch-line refer to
some bad thing happening and the joke's funniness is derived from the absurdity of the
comparison.
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A similar dynamic is at play in the telling of "shaggy dog" jokes, in which the
listener is given an exceedingly long and tedious set-up followed by a punch-line that is
so trivial and dull that calling it a punch-line at all feels like a bit of a stretch. These
jokes, while they certainly don't number among the funniest out there, are somewhat
interesting because they boil down to nothing more than anti-climactic stories dressed up
as jokes. The audience expects a joke and is given a boring, drawn-out story instead. A
not-funny story presented as a joke can sometimes be funny in virtue of its violating the
conceptual patterns we associate with joke telling. Incongruity theory is supported by this
ability to provide us with a cogent explanation for why a joke might be 'so not funny that
it's funny'.
However, there are also more sophisticated brands of metahumor that derive their
funniness, at least in part, from violating the conventional structure of jokes. For
example: What do you get when you cross a joke with a rhetorical question? When the
listener inquires about the difference they are met with silence. If anyone is amused by
this joke, they are amused by the incongruity between the conceptual pattern they usually
use to make sense of "what do you get when you cross..." type jokes and this particular
joke where the punch-line is cleverly embedded in the set-up. The ordinary joke formula,
in which a set-up is followed by a punch-line that bears an incongruous relationship to
the set-up, is violated by this joke; its success, rather, is based entirely on the incongruity
between its unique structure and our understanding of how "what do you get when you..."
jokes work.
Finally, I would like to address one last category of humorous incongruity, and
that is the humor of switched perspective. This kind of humor is interesting because it
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brings out assumptions we make about the objectivity—or at least the authority of a given
subjective viewpoint—of certain kinds of statements. By suggesting a viewpoint that is
different from the audience's ordinary viewpoint, humor of altered perspective presents
incongruity between the perspective from which we ordinarily experience a situation or
event and a different, if equally valid, perspective with which we are unfamiliar or at
least unused to adopting (Morreall, "Taking Laughter Seriously", 72). One such example
is Oscar Wilde's reversal of the temperance movement's adage, "drink is the curse of the
working class" into "work is the curse of the drinking class". I've heard a similar joke
made by members of sports teams or other groups who say things like, "hockey gets in
the way of my drinking team". This tactic is often used by comedians who render
ordinary situations funny by examining them from unusual perspectives. Jerry Seinfeld,
a master of observational humor, does a bit in which he imagines what aliens might
assume about the inter-species power dynamics on planet earth upon seeing people
picking up after their dogs.
On my block a lot of people walk their dogs, and I always see them
walking around with their little 'poop bags', which to me is just the lowest
function of human life. If aliens are watching this through telescopes
they're going to think the dogs are the leaders. If you see two life forms—
one of them is making a poop and other one is carrying it for them—who
would you assume is in charge? (The Dog)
By presenting a behavior as innocuous and ubiquitously accepted as picking up after a pet
dog in a public place from the point of view of aliens who are unfamiliar with it, Seinfeld
achieves a humorous effect. This kind of joke presents an incongruity between our
unquestioned perception of a certain 'normal' behavior, and the possibility that said
behavior is not, necessarily, such a normal thing to do. Such perspective switching is
stock and trade of observational comedy, a genre that thrives on framing the mundane as
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humorously absurd. A final example of humor based on altered perspective is the written
joke:
Day 19 I have successfully conditioned my master to get up and write in his notebook
every time I drool.
-Pavlov's Dog.

Other Factors in the Funniness of Incongruities
These joke examples serve to illustrate the range of situations and joke structures
that operate in accordance with the tenets of incongruity theory. The perception of
funniness in a great many cases can be coherently understood as resulting from the
violation of normal conceptual patterns. As is likely self-evident given the variety of
jokes presented in the preceding pages, there are many different shapes a humorous
incongruity can take. I have discussed at some length the process through which we can
be amused by an incongruity and how jokes take advantage of this by violating our
conceptual patterns. This violation, however, can be delivered in a number of ways, via
either jokes or humorous situations in day-to-day life. It is clear, however, that not all
incongruities are humorous. To reuse an example from the introduction, if I were to reach
toward fire and feel cold I would most likely not find the incident amusing. Mike Martin
(1987) aptly points out that we find many incongruities pleasing but not amusing, citing
surrealist art as an example (177). Another such example is the experience of observing a
magician perform. If he is talented, the audience is bound to encounter innumerable
incongruities (between their perceptions of the show and their conceptual understanding
of the laws of nature) throughout the performance: rabbits coming out of hats, coins
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disappearing, women sawed in half then miraculously resurrected. Though we enjoy
experiencing such incongruous events, it seems like a stretch to consider them funny per
se, although it might be noted that we sometimes respond with non-humorous laughter in
these situations. Additionally, many incongruous events or situations are neither amusing
nor pleasurable, some are unsettling or uncomfortable while others can be downright
distressing or traumatic. Missing a step while walking down a dark staircase can be
incongruous and not at all funny (at least not for the person falling). The same is true for
the person who takes a sip from a glass of clear liquid thinking it's gin, only to discover
that it's gasoline (again, not funny for the accidental gas-drinker). There are many such
cases of non-humorous incongruities, and their incontrovertible existence suggests that
incongruity may well be a necessary condition for amusement, but it cannot possibly be
sufficient. So, we must ask of incongruity theory, what conditions besides the presence of
an incongruity must be met in order that we find a given situation, event, or object
amusing?
A number of philosophers have followed James Beattie (1779) in addressing the
existence of non-funny incongruities by arguing that the laughter reaction to an
incongruity only occurs when there is no more powerful emotional or psychological
reaction simultaneously present. In other words, if an incongruity triggers grief, anxiety,
jealousy, anger, etc. in the subject, they will not find it funny because these more
powerful emotions take precedent. This would explain why we don't find the sight of a
truck hitting a pedestrian after running a red light funny. Alarm, stress, and concern
would presumably override anything we might find humorous about the situation.
(Again, it's worth noting, as an aside, that in some of these cases people might react with
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non-humorous nervous or hysterical laughter). Psychological or emotional distance,
however, is capable of muting these other reactions. An event that would be traumatic to
witness in person can be rendered funny in a film or a cartoon; a character getting
blindsided by a truck or bus is a mainstay of the slapstick genre. Of course there are
degrees of separation that influence how amused we will be by a given situation. Take,
for instance, the previous paragraph's examples of stumbling down the stairs or
accidentally sipping gasoline with the pretense that it is gin. If these misfortunes befell us
personally, we would likely not be amused (at least not right away), unless we were
unharmed and in a relatively light-hearted mood. But even if we emerge unscathed,
falling down the stairs after a long, stressful day at work is unlikely to amuse anyone.
Mood, too, then, is an important variable in the amusement equation. A film poking fun
at an unlucky-in-love middle-aged man would likely not amuse a viewer watching the
film the day after his wife leaves him, regardless of how funny he might have found it the
week before.
In addition to mood and psychological or emotional distance, there is the factor of
temporal distance. As Mark Twain is said to have remarked, "comedy is tragedy plus
time". Experiences that are humiliating in the moment can also eventually become funny
memories once embarrassment is no longer our primary emotional reaction (we are often
embarrassed by accidentally behaving in ways that violate the normal order of things).
The same can be said about the tragic. There are endless, if for the most part somewhat
offensive, jokes made about events like the Holocaust, American slavery, natural
disasters, and so forth. Jokes about celebrity deaths and other violent news items also
abound. When telling such jokes, the remark "too soon" is often made, either as a
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criticism by the listener or as a question by the teller, tacitly suggesting that there is some
appropriate amount of time that ought to elapse before jokes about a tragedy can be
funny.
Comedian Louis C.K. (2008), known for his crude, self-deprecating brand of
humor, has played on this convention, joking that, "you can figure out how bad a person
you are by how soon after 9/11 you masturbated—like, by how long you waited. For me
it was between the two buildings going down". This joke, while still quite controversial,
would have been wildly offensive (to many) if it had been delivered on the heels of the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. The psychological distance afforded by time mitigates the
offensiveness of jokes like this one, allowing us to find the incongruity presented
amusing rather than enraging, depressing or otherwise upsetting. Of course, some of us
may have found it funny immediately after the incident and some of us might never think
that this joke is funny.
Somewhat similarly, the comedian Tig Notaro (2013) received a great deal of
attention after delivering an extremely personal stand-up comedy performance in which
she makes jokes about her recent (three days prior) diagnosis with breast cancer. Much of
the humor in this routine is derived by making fun of the audience for laughing at the
jokes while simultaneously making fun of them for being uncomfortable with the jokes.
Early in the bit she recounts an anecdote in which upon finding out about Notaro's illness,
a friend asks her if she's seen 'those funny cancer greeting cards'.
"And so my friend texted me one of the cards. The outside of the card says: So
you have cancer. Sad face. Then you open the card. And it says, 'thank goodness.
I’ve been looking for a reason to shave my head.'"
When this remark was greeted with hesitant laughter from the audience she
continues:
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"I can’t believe that’s what you guys haven’t laughed at tonight. That was straight
from the funny cancer greeting cards." (Live)
Terminal illnesses like cancer, that wreak havoc on the lives of many people, are
ordinarily considered taboo topics for joking. By joking about her disease, Notaro creates
an incongruity between the conceptual norm and an specific experience for the audience.
When they are uncomfortable laughing at that incongruity she pushes it a step farther,
highlighting the incongruity inherent in "funny cancer greeting cards" as well as the
incongruities between what the audience is willing to laugh at. After all, if they can laugh
about 9/11 why can't they laugh about cancer?
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Chapter 3 — Origins of Incongruity Theory
Kant and Schopenhauer
The initial development of incongruity theory is most often attributed to the work
of Immanuel Kant who briefly addresses the issue of humor and, more precisely,
laughter, in his seminal Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). Though the term
"incongruity" itself is conspicuously absent from these pages (the phrase "incongruity
theory" has been retroactively applied to a group of early philosophical accounts of
humor in recent years), Kant's work on laughter and amusement is clearly in the business
of describing the kind of dynamic at play in incongruity-based humor. In spite of the
frustratingly small amount of space devoted to his theories of humor, the handful of
passages Kant dedicates to examining the cause of laughter seem to suggest that he
understood the amusement-reaction to comedy as an intellectual, cognitive process. This
interpretation of Kant, if it is in fact accurate, is consistent with our contemporary
conceptual pattern-based account of humor and its framing of amusement as a cognitive
process rather than an emotional one (Morreall, "Taking Laughter Seriously", 15).
Though Kant never actually writes the word "incongruity" when addressing humor, he
posits laughter (which he seems to conflate with the perception of humor) as a reaction to
a situation or utterance that is unexpected, absurd, illogical, or otherwise inappropriate in
some way. Though these terms are not sufficiently specific to constitute the basis of a
cogent theory of humor, interpreting this language as a recognition of—and attempted
articulation of— a certain kind of incongruity at the source of amusement is relatively
uncontroversial.
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Kant seems to identify three main components of the humorous. I will articulate
them and then attempt to explain how they fit together as a theory of humor. First of all,
Kant argues that, "In everything that is to excite a lively convulsive laugh there must be
something absurd (in which the understanding, therefore, can find no satisfaction)" (CPJ,
§53 5:333). Absurdity, then, Kant seems to be saying, is a necessary condition for
amusement. We cannot be amused by anything that is not, at least somewhat, absurd.
In order for the amusement reaction to take place, Kant argues, a subject must have a
sensory perception that cannot be properly processed by his intellectual faculties. In other
words, amusement is the result of an experience that is so absurd or nonsensical that we
are incapable of understanding it.
Equally important in Kant's account of humor is the relationship between
amusement and disappointed or frustrated expectations. Kant makes his own view on this
matter quite clear, writing that, "Laughter is an affectation arising from the sudden
transformation of a strained expectation into nothing" (CPJ, §53 5:333). There is some
ambiguity as to what precisely Kant means by the "transformation of a strained
expectation into nothing", but it seems reasonable to interpret this clause as a reference to
expectations that are shown to have been misguided or unfounded. In any situation we
generate expectations for certain outcomes based on our previous experiences of similar
situations. When those expectations are shown to be inaccurate, we laugh, says Kant.
Finally, though it bears some relation to Kant's emphasis on the importance of
frustrated expectations for the perception of humor, Kant argues that a third important
part of the amusement process is momentary deception. That is, we must be fooled at
least a little bit by whatever it is that we find funny. Kant writes, "a joke must always
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contain something that can deceive for a moment" (CPJ, §53 5:334). In some senses, this
assertion seems to be an extension of Kant's criteria of frustrated expectations; we are
deceived into expecting outcomes that are not delivered. However, this does not
necessarily exclude other kinds of deception from amusing us, so it seems valuable to
leave the option open.
In sum, Kant posits three necessary conditions for amusement: in anything we
find funny there must be some element of absurdity; anything we find funny must
frustrate our expectations; and anything we find funny must momentarily deceive us. In
order to more fully understand and critique Kant's view, I will attempt to apply it to
several jokes as an explanation for why they are funny. In doing so I hope to show the
strengths and weaknesses of Kant's account as it applies to actual instances of
amusement. Perhaps it is best to begin with a (not so funny) joke that Kant himself
provides as an example for his account.
The heir of a rich relative wished to arrange for an imposing funeral but he
lamented that he could not properly succeed; "for" (said he) "the more money I
give my mourners to look sad, the more cheerful they look!" (CPJ, §53 5:333)
How does Kant's account explain what is funny about this joke? Let's begin with the
criteria of absurdity. It is hard to know exactly what Kant means when he refers to
absurdity in the context of humor. In fact, there is some discrepancy amongst translators
as to how the term should be rendered in English, some translations read "absurd" while
others read "nonsensical". Either way, Kant seems to think that the absurdity or nonsense
at play in this joke has to do with the 'paradox' surrounding the affect of the mourners.
Namely, the more money they are given to do their job well (that is, to look sad), the less
able they are to do their job well (because they are so pleased with their reward). Does
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this dynamic qualify as absurd? Perhaps to a certain extent, but not in the most robust
sense of the word.
Kant however, places a great deal of emphasis on the dynamics of the audience's
expectation for the joke. He writes—literally repeating himself—that the reason we laugh
upon hearing this joke is that, "an expectation is suddenly transformed into nothing"
(CPJ, §53 5:333.). The expectation engendered by the beginning of the joke—namely
that we are about to hear a sad story about a failed funeral—is reduced to nothing when
we realize that the rich relative is upset about something trivial. This transformation,
Kant says, is what causes our amusement. Momentary deception, in the case of this joke,
only seems to apply to the audience's expectations. That is, we are momentarily deceived
when we think we are about to hear a sad story about a failed funeral because what we
are about to hear is, in fact, a funny story about a failed funeral.
In Kant's lectures reproduced in Anthropology from A Pragmatic Point of View
(1798), he restates his account of laughter in such a way that he combines the absurdity
condition and the frustrated expectations condition. Kant writes, "If a mistaken judgment
involves a great absurdity, this can produce exactly the same effect [laughter]"
("Anthropology", §79 7:262). With this in mind, it is easier to understand Kant's account
of absurdity as a necessary condition for humor in terms of the audience's expectations
rather than as absurdity in general. It seems unlikely that he thinks we only laugh at
absurd things because this would be an obviously false claim (there are innumerable
situations in which we laugh at things that are not absurd or fail to laugh at things that are
absurd). His emphatic inclusion of frustrated expectations as an important part of
amusement suggests his possible belief in a relationship between absurdity and
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misinformed expectations, a relationship that is foundational to incongruity theory. If we
find an experience absurd, Kant may be arguing, we do so because it fails to conform to
the expectations we have about the way the world works. We laugh when we generate
expectations for a certain outcome of a given situation and then are presented with an
outcome that is absurd in light of those expectations. We don't perceive our expectations
as absurd, rather, we perceive experiences that fail to meet our rationally generated
expectations as absurd. When we try and fail to conform the absurd experience to our
expectations we realize that our expectations were, in fact, misguided, and we laugh.
Let's try applying Kant's theory to some more contemporary jokes. For clarity's
sake, let's summarize Kant's position thus far: amusement results from an experience that
deceives us momentarily, and, which gives rise to expectations that do not adequately
apply to the experience. Here is a joke that, according to a 2002 study by Richard
Wiseman of LaughLab, is one of the funniest jokes in the world (although that does not
necessarily mean that it is).
Two hunters are out in the woods when one of them collapses. He doesn't
seem to be breathing and his eyes are glazed. The other guy whips out his
phone and calls the emergency services. He gasps, "My friend is dead!
What can I do?". The operator says "Calm down. I can help. First, let's
make sure he's dead." There is a silence, then a shot is heard. Back on the
phone, the guy says "OK, now what?"
According to Kant's formulation of incongruity theory, this joke might be funny
for a number of reasons. First of all, the punch-line contains a behavior that is absurd (or
nonsensical) in light of audience expectations engendered not only by the set up but also
by their experiences in the world. In any situation where a normal person is trying to
determine if their friend, god forbid, is dead, we expect them to check vital signs, to listen
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for a heartbeat or for breathing. In this respect, the hunter's actions are absurd—he called
911 trying to save his friend's life, why would he then proceed to shoot him (an action
that is in direct contradiction with his goal of saving his friend)? There is, however, in
this joke, something that clearly does "deceive for a moment". Namely, the ambiguous
wording of the EMS operator's command. Though her words would ordinarily be
sufficiently clear, we are deceived by the way the joke conceals the hunter's
misinterpretation. After the punch-line is delivered, the audience realizes that they failed
to understand the possibility that the operator's words could be misconstrued and that
they failed to realize that the hunter had in fact misconstrued the operator's words. This,
in addition to the manipulation of audience expectations and the absurdity of the hunter's
actions, make the joke amusing on Kant's account.

Preliminary Objections to Kant
Though Kant's account is relatively sophisticated, it suffers from some major
flaws. The most basic of which, perhaps, is the emphasis he places on frustrated
expectations rather than, as it is put in Chapter 2, violations of conceptual patterns or of
the normal order of things. It is problematic to reduce incongruity theory to the
frustration of expectations because doing so removes any possibility for explaining why
we can be amused by the same thing more than once or when we know that we're hearing
a joke. As discussed in Chapter 2, surprise cannot be a necessary condition for
amusement because if it were, expecting to be amused (as in many cases of joke-telling
or film-going, for instance) would preclude the possibility for actual amusement. This is
clearly not the case. As Kenneth Lash (1948) puts it, "it is not the surprise of the
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spontaneous that makes us laugh, but rather its incongruous relationship with the more or
less static pattern it interrupts" (116).
Additionally, Kant's vague language opens his account up to criticism. For
instance, his insistence that audience expectations specifically "be reduced to nothing".
Rather than simply saying that their expectations need to be frustrated to perceive humor,
he emphasizes the "nothing" aspect. He writes, "it [the expectation] must not be
transformed into the positive opposite of an expected object—for that is always
something, and can be distressing—but into nothing" (CPJ, §53 5:333). This
consideration is somewhat baffling, but Kant seems to be attempting to create a
distinction between what constitutes a funny joke (a statement that often contains false
information) and a flat-out lie. When we are told something that immediately recognize
as untrue, we are not amused.
Similarly, Kant's emphasis on the necessity of absurdity for the perception of
humor to take place is untenable. For instance, in the joke above, if instead of shooting
his friend to make sure he was dead the hunter stripped and climbed a tree nude, we
wouldn't find the joke amusing. If this modification were actually made, the joke would
still be absurd and the expectations of the audience would still be frustrated but it
wouldn't be nearly as funny. It seems that Kant's account is missing a third consideration
for what makes jokes funny because it is entirely possible for a situation to be absurd and
to frustrate a subject's expectations without amusing them. I suspect Kant may have been
getting at this third consideration with his discussion of the deceptive quality of humor,
but he doesn't quite seem to articulate it properly. With three somewhat vague necessary
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conditions for the perception of amusement, Kant's account suffers from a combination of
excessive complication and lack of specificity.
It difficult to say with certainty if Kant's account suggests that these three
necessary conditions combine to produce a sufficient condition for the perception of
humor. It seems likely, however, that this is his intention. Nonetheless, there are
numerous counterexamples to this interpretation of his account. In a slight modification
of the cold fire case, imagine reaching out towards a fire and feeling cold, only to realize
that it wasn't in fact a fire but a block of ice very convincingly disguised as fire. In this
case your expectations are frustrated, an element of absurdity is present, and you are have
momentarily deceived by the convincing disguise. Furthermore, in this case you wouldn't
be met with the positive opposite of your expectations and as far as I can see your
expectations would be "reduced to nothing". Nonetheless, you would most likely not be
amused. The necessary conditions provided by Kant are too broad and do not
appropriately combine into a sufficient condition for the perception of humor. By placing
too much emphasis on the condition of frustrated expectations and absurdity, Kant allows
for too many non-humorous incongruities to meet his criteria for the humorous. By
orienting his view along the lines of concept-object incongruity, Schopenhauer is able to
somewhat improve on Kant's account of incongruity theory.

Schopenhauer
Schopenhauer improves Kant's account by focusing less on absurdity and
frustrated expectations, instead suggesting that amusement is caused by incongruities
between individual perceptions and conceptual abstractions (WWI I, §13).
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Schopenhauer's position on humor and, as he calls it, 'the ludicrous', stands on his
assertion of a gap between rational abstractions about the world and individual
perceptions of it. In Volume I of The World as Will and Idea, Schopenhauer argues that
abstract rational knowledge is founded on our perceptions of the world around us but that
it is impossible for our abstract, conceptual representations to ever fully "apply to the fine
distinctions of difference and innumerable modifications of the actual" (§13). In other
words, considering the infinite shades of nuance given to objects in the perceived world,
our abstract ideas or concepts, which are drawn from the synthesis and extension of
individual perceptions, can never describe the material world with complete accuracy. To
illustrate this aspect of his metaphysics, imagine the abstract concept of a chair. After
many years of looking at, sitting in (and maybe even falling out of) chairs, we develop an
abstract concept for the kind of objects that can be described as chairs. This concept
might be something like "a sturdy structure for sitting in, usually with four legs,
sometimes with wheels or rockers". Though this abstract concept accurately describes a
lot of chairs, it is impossible for the concept to describe every chair you will ever
perceive with complete accuracy. Schopenhauer likens the difference between the world
given to us through perception and our abstract, conceptual ideas about the world to the
difference between a painting and a tile mosaic; the mosaic closely approximates the
shapes and colors of the painting but will never be able to achieve the same level of
descriptive detail (WWI I, §13).
In the passages he devotes to his discussion of the ludicrous and the cause of
laughter, Schopenhauer asserts that laughter is caused by the recognition of a particularly
striking incongruous relationship between an individual perception of an object and a
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subject's conceptual representation of it. "The cause of laughter in every case is simply
the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which
have been thought through it in some relation, and laughter itself is just the expression of
this incongruity" (WWI I, §13). Schopenhauer identifies two ways in which we come to
recognize such an incongruity. In the first case, we subsume two different objects under
the same concept. When it becomes clear that the two objects are different in many
respects and can only be subsumed under the same category from a "one-sided point of
view", we recognize the incongruity between our conceptual representation of the
object(s) and the objects themselves (WWI I, §13). Humorous puns, for instance, would
be an example of this process. Equally common, according to Schopenhauer, are
occasions on which we notice an incongruity between a single real object and a concept
under which, in some respects, it is correctly subsumed but in other respects it is
incorrectly subsumed. About this process, Schopenhauer writes, "the more correct the
subsumption of such objects under a concept may be from one point of view, and the
greater and more glaring their incongruity with it, from another point of view, the greater
is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. All laughter then is occasioned
by a paradox...whether expressed in words or actions" (WWI I, §13).
Though no examples of this theory are provided in Volume I, Schopenhauer
provides an example of this kind of humorous incongruity in Volume II of The World as
Will and Representation (1844). He suggests the image of a physician's headstone
inscribed with an epithet usually reserved for heroic fallen soldiers: Here like a hero he
lies, and those he has slain lie around him (93). In this case, Schopenhauer writes, the
individual perception of the doctor is, in one respect, correctly subsumed under the
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conceptual representation of "hero". Equally correctly subsumed under the concept of
"hero" is a fallen soldier who claimed the lives of many enemies. The specific heromaking properties of the doctor and soldier are completely different, however, so
different in fact, that they are opposites. Though the perception of the doctor matches the
conceptual representation of "hero" as, say, "a great man", it does not match the
conceptual representation of a hero as "a man who has killed many people" (WWR II, 93).
The concept of "hero" applies correctly to the particular perception of the doctor from
some angles but not from others; the concept is too general to capture all the various
instantiations of heroes that are available in the real world. Because, on Schopenhauer's
account, the concept "hero" is extremely appropriate to perception of "a doctor" on the
hand but extremely incongruous on the other, this incongruity is capable of amusing us
(Lewis, 43).
We can observe comedy functioning in a similar way when we consider this
contemporary joke set in a doctor's office:
A man goes in to see the doctor for a physical. The doctor comes into the
room and says,
"I've got some bad news, you're going to have to stop eating that
red meat."
"Oh no", the patient moans, "How come?"
The doctor replies,
"So I can examine you!"
If we analyze this joke's funniness according to Kant's account, we would be forced into
saying something about the absurdity of the situation. While there is something absurd
about a man eating a steak in a hospital gown on an examination table, there is nothing
really absurd about the doctor's reaction; in most cases, it seems, if a patient were to eat a
large, messy meal at their appointment, the doctor would tell them to stop.
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Schopenhauer's account, however, avoids this pitfall by acknowledging that there is a set
of expectations and an assumed etiquette that conceptually govern doctor-patient
interactions; these expectations and norms are features of the conceptual representations
of 'a doctor' and 'a visit to the doctor's office' that may not be present in every instance of
doctors and doctor's office visits in the real world. When the doctor tells the patient that
he shouldn't eat so much red meat, the audience makes a number of assumptions about
what the doctor means based on their conceptual, abstract understanding of a doctor as a
person who gives useful health advice to patients. We also assume—in accordance with
doctor's office etiquette—that most patients would never consider eating a T-bone while
sitting on an examination table. With these assumptions in place, the joke's set up leads
us to be amused by the incongruity between our conceptual representation of doctorpatient interaction and the individual perception of the doctor-patient interaction in the
joke. Namely, that the doctor is not giving the patient a direct command to stop eating red
meat at that moment, but that he is suggesting that his patient eat less red meat in general.
The instruction to "stop eating so much red meat" in the context of a doctor's office is
ordinarily correctly subsumed under the concept of "health advice" but in this particular
case that concept is inaccurate; the instruction isn't health advice but an expression of a
logistical concern. When the incongruity between concept and perception is recognized,
we react with laughter.
It may be worth noting that a joke like this seems to intentionally promote the
latter assumption. Though "you're going to have to stop eating that red meat" is
technically something the doctor might say to refer to a particular instance of his patient
eating red meat, if someone were actually eating a steak on the examination table the
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doctor would probably use more specific language, i.e. "please stop eating that steak, this
room was just sterilized 5 minutes ago!". The use of general term "red meat" leads the
audience to categorize the intent of the statement, conceptually, as general advice rather
than as a specific, practical instruction.
Peter Lewis (2005) uses an apt example from the opening of Woody Allen's opus
Annie Hall (1977) to illustrate Schopenhauer's account. In the film, Allen recites 'an old
joke': Two women are at a Catskill mountain resort and one turns to the other and says,
"Gee, the food at this place is really terrible." to which her friend responds, "I know and
such small portions". Parsing this joke with Schopenhauer's account of humor, Lewis
writes that, "ordinarily, when assessing hotel food, 'small portions' is an acceptable
complaint; but in this case, while 'small portions' is a correct description, it is a
paradoxical complaint in light of the fact that the food is especially poor" (41). Lewis'
analysis here is quite helpful in illustrating an important point about Schopenhauer's
articulation of incongruity theory. Namely, his argument that we laugh when an object or
event can be subsumed properly under an abstract concept in most respects but in one
particularly relevant respect is incongruous (WWI I, §13). In this case, "small portions" as
an instantiation of the conceptual category of "food complaints" is incongruous because
of one particular aspect of the particular food in question, namely that it is terrible. In
most cases, a complaint about small portions would be congruous with the concept of
"food complaints", and so would not be funny
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Chapter 4 — Objections and Critique
Both Kant and Schopenhauer provide interesting and somewhat successful
accounts of incongruity theory, but they both suffer from ambiguity about whether or not
they are providing necessary or sufficient conditions for amusement. It seems that in both
cases the intent is to provide sufficient conditions but the conditions provided are only
serviceable as necessary conditions. Both Kant and Schopenhauer frame their accounts as
explanations for all instances of laughter (though I suspect their work is intended to be
limited to the scope of humorous laughter), but counter-examples are readily available
against both accounts. Namely, the existence of incongruities that are not amusing
regardless of how the incongruity is framed.
A serious problem with incongruity theory is that it seeks to explain both why a
given subject finds certain situations amusing and why certain situations have the
potential to amuse certain subjects. Incongruity theory as an account of the features a
situation must have if it is to potentially be perceived as funny by a given subject can get
away with providing only necessary conditions. Even if the necessary conditions for
potential funniness are met by some situation (i.e. if the situation is perceived as
incongruous by the subject), it is still possible for the subject not to be amused by it. In
this respect, those who defend incongruity theory could assert that any incongruous
situation has the potential to be funny (even reaching out toward fire and feeling cold),
but that a subject's not perceiving it as funny is due to some aspect of their psychology,
their mood, their conceptual frame of reference, etc. This alone, however, is not
particularly satisfying if we are looking for an explanation of why we, as individuals, find
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things funny. It seems that there are plenty of situations that present an incongruity by
violating our normal conceptual patterns at times when we are easily disposed to
amusement, that don't amuse us. I've already mentioned Mike Martin's point about surreal
art, and my own example of incongruities at a magic show. In the previous chapter on
Kant I discussed how the joke about the hunter can be modified to remain incongruous
but lose its humorousness nevertheless; it has been well established that a situation can
meet the necessary conditions for the perception of humor laid out by incongruity theory
but nevertheless fail to amuse us.
It seems that Kant and Schopenhauer, as well as the contemporary accounts of
incongruity theory on which my own is based, are vulnerable to this criticism.
Essentially, they are too broad and fail to provide sufficient conditions for amusement.
Incongruity theory asserts that a subject will be amused if and only if (a) they perceive an
incongruity between an actual experience and a conceptual pattern while being (b) in the
right kind of mood and (c) bearing the right kind of emotional and temporal relationship
to the incongruity in question. These conditions are too complex and contingent to form a
satisfying account.
It is my contention that incongruity theory needs to provide an explanation for
why we don't always find instances of random absurdity amusing. It seems possible that
providing a completely watertight sufficient condition for amusement or the perception of
humor may be beyond reach. And though I doubt it will solve the sufficient condition
problem entirely, I believe that an inquiry into the relationship between humorous
incongruities and their relationship to rationality, or the congruous, will provide some
insight into the question of what distinguishes humorous conceptual incongruities from
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incongruities in general. It is my contention that we are most amused by incongruities
that present themselves in such a way that their incongruity is not immediately apparent
and that amusement results from recognizing the incongruity at the core of an event or
object that doesn't immediately appear incongruous. I also believe that by engaging in
this inquiry we can show that there is something fundamentally humorous about the
human condition itself.
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Chapter 5 — Humor and Fundamental Incongruities
In the final chapter I turn my attention to the relationship between comedy and
reason. The goal of this investigation is two-fold. First, I hope to identify and provide
evidence for the existence of an important relationship between reason and humorous
incongruity that helps incongruity theory respond to the objection raised in the previous
chapter. To accomplish this I will show that we are most amused by the presence of
incongruities that do not immediately seem incongruous. Secondly, I will show how
humor's close relationship with reason is responsible for humor thriving in the spaces
where reason fails to satisfy our curiosity. I will identify two closely related fundamental
incongruities inherent in the human condition. The first is between the abstract rationality
that frames conceptual thought and the irrationality of human behavior and the world.
The second fundamental incongruity is between the seriousness with which we take our
lives, beliefs, thoughts, reasons, etc. and our ability to acknowledge the possibility that
everything about our lives is arbitrary or meaningless and thus not worth taking seriously.
Some form of these two fundamental incongruities, I believe, can be found in almost all
instances of amusement.
That there is a close relationship between humor (or, as it is often put, laughter)
and reason has been asserted for quite some time, although historically the discussion of
this relationship often paints humor in an exceedingly negative light. In The Republic,
Plato repeatedly argues against the virtue of laughter and comedy on the grounds that
laughing not only renders people irresponsible and weak, but that all humor frustrates
reason (Morreall, "Taking Laughter Seriously", 85). Plato writes that "any poetry which
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portrays eminent humans as being overcome by laughter" ought to be refused and gives a
doubly emphatic condemnation of depictions of the gods laughing (Republic III, 388e).
Similar statements about the frustration of reason inherent in amusement can be found in
the work of many thinkers throughout history. Morreall (1983) has collected a number of
salient examples. For instance Lord Chesterfield's insistence that, "there is nothing so
illiberal, and ill-bred, as audible laughter. True wit, or sense, never yet made anybody
laugh...I am as willing and apt to be pleased as anybody; but I am sure that since I had
full use of my reason nobody has ever heard me laugh" (Morreall, 88). Equally vehement
is Ludovici's assertion that, "humour is the lazier principle to adopt in approaching all
questions [compared to reason], and that is why the muddle is increasing everywhere"
(88). Along the same lines, George Vasey wonders if, "children would ever begin to
laugh...if they were treated naturally and rationally" (88). Though most contemporary
writers in the philosophy of humor take a more favorable approach to the matter of
humor itself, incongruity theory—however formulated—necessarily allows for
amusement to result from the frustration of reason (but not, as Kant argues, that
amusement will necessarily result from the frustration of reason). On Kant's account
events or objects that pervert or distort reason will strike us as absurd, unexpected, or
deceptive. For Schopenhauer especially, humor necessarily frustrates reason because his
metaphysics asserts that our conceptual representations (which are shown to be
inadequate by the humorous) are derived rationally. Finally, it is clear how reason itself
and our faith in the power of reason underlie and account for many of our conceptual
patterns. We understand the world as ordered, as governed by rational chains of causes
and justifications. Our picture of the normal order of things, in this sense, is based on our
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rationally derived conceptual models of experience; we perceive objects or events as
incongruous when they fail to conform to this rational conceptual model of the world.
Incongruity theory, therefore, is obligated to assert the contradiction or failure of reason
as (at least) a possible source of amusement. Nonetheless, our continued adherence to
rational thought and our faith in the firm structure of reason as a governing framework
for the universe is crucial to the comedic process; if the universe were absolutely chaotic,
there would be no incongruity (in virtue of the fact that there would be no expectation of
congruity), and therefore, according to incongruity theory, no humor. Kenneth Lash
(1948) addresses this aspect of incongruity theory, writing that, "in a universe completely
dominated by chance...any fixity or semi-fixity of expectation would be nonexistent;
therefore because we have found humor to result from the incongruity between
preconceived ideas and actuality, the comic would, of necessity, disappear" (116).
Because humor frustrates reason is no cause to think that it dismantles its tenets,
however. Rather, humor seems at once to subvert and uphold reason, it fills in where
reason is stymied and reminds us that although reason is often reliable, there are aspects
of life that don't fit the rational model.
The end goal of this chapter is to investigate the way humor operates in the
epistemological void left by rational inquiry into metaphysical problems beyond the
realm of experience. In order to do so, however, it is prudent to first demonstrate the
existence of an important relationship between reason or humor in mundane or simple
jokes. Manipulations and perversions of logic are a consistent part of jokes and a great
many joke formulas and jokes themselves are essentially dressed-up examples of logical
fallacies or simple plays on the flawed use of logic. The relationship between the paradox

45

and comedy has long been noted, perhaps most significantly by Schopenhauer who uses
the term 'paradox' as a foundational component of his theory of the ludicrous. Marie
Swabey (1961) also finds evidence of the paradoxical aspect of humor in Plato's Philebus
where he likens laughter to relieving an itch by scratching it in that both experiences
result in both pleasure and pain (161). It seems natural, then, that one type of logical
incongruity frequently employed for humorous effect is the paradox. Here is an
exceedingly simple example from Cathcart and Klein's (2007) book of philosophical
jokes:
Salesman: "This vacuum cleaner will cut your work in half!"
Customer: "Terrific, give me two of 'em!"
(94)
It shouldn't be much of a stretch to understand how this old routine plays on a logical
paradox (seemingly sound reasoning, based on seemingly true premises that leads to a
false conclusion) for humorous effect. Cathcart and Klein explain this joke in terms of
Zeno's Paradox, but it also plays on the failure of pure reason to adequately account for
the peculiarities of language and of human life in general. Though at first blush it may be
hard (at least for the non-philosopher) to see what exactly is wrong with the reasoning in
this joke, almost everyone who hears it will understand that there is something off about
the logic. If the customer has x amount of vacuuming to do and he buys a vacuum that
will cut his work in half he will have 1/2x work to do. If he buys the second vacuum he'll
have 1/2(1/2x) work to do, or 1/4x work to do. And so on for each additional vacuum he
buys. Instead, the customer incorrectly understands the phrase "cut your work in half" to
mean that the vacuum will do 1/2x work as a concrete, non-relative amount of work. If he
takes this faulty interpretation seriously, it would follow that buying two vacuums would
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cut his work by 100%, a conclusion that is obviously false but is arrived at in a seemingly
sound way. A similar process is at play in simple linguistic tricks like Yogi Berra's
famous quip, "Always go to other people's funerals, otherwise they won't come to yours".
The reason provided in support of his suggestion to "always attend other people's
funerals" seems, at first glance, to be a valid reason; after all, if you don't attend
someone's funeral they certainly won't be at yours. It's just that the reason they won't be
at your funeral isn't that you failed to attend theirs, but due to the fact that they'll
necessarily (given the nature of funerals) be dead.
We are often amused by statements that appear to be necessarily false but also
appear necessarily true at the same time. Morreall gives this example:
An art dealer bought a canvas signed 'Picasso' and travelled to Cannes to see if it
was genuine. Picasso took one look and said, "It's a fake".
A few months later, the man bought another canvass signed 'Picasso' and
returned to Cannes. Again Picasso said, "It's a fake".
"Cher Maître", the man protested, "It so happens that I saw you with my
own eyes working on this very painting several years ago".
Picasso simply shrugged his shoulders and replied, "I often paint fakes".
(76)
This anecdote is amusing because it presents the listener with a situation that
seems possible and impossible at once; the painting in question is an authentic, fake
Picasso, a situation that seems unworkable. In fact, the only possible way a painting
could qualify as fake and as an authentic Picasso is if Picasso himself painted a 'fake'
(which, of course, seems impossible for Picasso to do). This story is humorously
incongruous in its violation of our understanding of what constitutes authentic authorship
and what constitutes a fake piece of artwork. We ordinarily believe that a painting p
created by artist q is authentic if and only if q in fact painted p. However we also give
creative authority to artists as to the nature of their art. In this case, Picasso is insisting
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that the painting is a fake, an assertion that contradicts the results of the formula for
authenticity above. If Picasso says that p is a 'fake Picasso' but that he in fact painted p,
then p is both authentic and fake at the same time. In fact, Picasso is the only person on
the planet who would seem incapable of painting a fake Picasso.
Here is another example of a joke based on flawed logic. In this case the story
manipulates the process of deductive logic, its potential to amuse is derived from a
flawed premise in the argument.
An old cowboy goes into a bar and orders a drink. As he sits there sipping
his whiskey, a young lady sits down next to him. She turns to the cowboy
and asks him, “Are you a real cowboy?”
He replies, “Well, I’ve spent my whole life on the ranch, herding
horses, mending fences, and branding cattle, so, yeah, I reckon I am a real
cowboy.”
The woman responds, “I’m a lesbian. I spend my whole day
thinking about women. As soon as I get up in the morning , I think about
women. When I shower or watch TV, everything seems to make me think
of women.”
A little while later, a couple sits down next to the old cowboy and
asks him, "Are you a real cowboy?”
He replies, "Well, I always thought I was, but earlier today I found
out that I’m a lesbian!” (Cathcart, Klein, 34)
This joke is funny because the cowboy employs a false premise in his evaluation
of his identity. Using the argument,
P1) If a person spends all their time doing X and thinking about X, then they are
a real X-er
P2) I spend all my time doing X
∴ I am a real X-er
The cowboy arrives at the conclusion that he is a real cowboy. When the woman
uses the same reasoning to show she is a lesbian, substituting "if a woman" for "if a
person" in P1, the cowboy, failing to understand that P1 is no longer is true for him,
comes to the false conclusion that he, too, is a lesbian (34). In this case, what is amusing
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is the cowboy's slavish adherence to deductive logic coupled with his failure to revisit his
argument after arriving at an obviously faulty conclusion. Such devotion to the results of
deductive reasoning is incongruous with the ordinary way in which we construct
identities for ourselves. Furthermore, the cowboy's willingness to re-identify himself on a
dime is incongruous with our conceptual understanding of how personal identities work;
that is, that they are not ordinarily changed so lightly.
Another logical fallacy that is often invoked by jokesters is the post hoc ergo
propter hoc fallacy. This fallacy is to conclude that because one event follows another the
second event is caused by the first (Dowden, IEP). An outrageously exaggerated instance
of this fallacy would be to believe that because every morning the train passes your house
right after you wake up, that your waking up is what causes the train to pass by. In many
cases, instances of this fallacy are easy to spot, but sometimes, especially when they are
cleverly hidden, instances of this fallacy can slip past us unnoticed. Here is an example of
a joke that manipulates the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy very nicely.
An older Jewish gentleman marries a younger lady, and they are very
much in love. However, no matter what the husband does sexually, the woman
never reaches orgasm. Since a Jewish wife is entitled to sexual pleasure, they
decide to ask the rabbi. The rabbi listens to their story, strokes his beard, and
makes the following suggestion:
“Hire a strapping young man. While the two of you are making love, have
the young man wave a towel over you. That will help the wife fantasize and
should bring on an orgasm.”
They go home and follow the rabbi’s advice. They hire a handsome young
man and he waves a towel over them as they make love. It doesn’t help, and she is
still unsatisfied. Perplexed, they go back to the rabbi.
“Okay,” says the rabbi to the husband, “let’s try it reversed. Have the
young man make love to your wife and you wave the towel over them.”
Once again, they follow the rabbi’s advice. The young man gets into bed
with the wife, and the husband waves the towel. The young man gets to work with
great enthusiasm and the wife soon has an enormous, room-shaking, screaming
orgasm. The husband smiles, looks at the young man and says to him
triumphantly,
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"You schmuck, that’s the way you wave a towel!” (Cathcart, Klein, 40)
There are a number of incongruities at play in all these jokes between conceptual
patterns and individual experiences that contradict or don't properly apply to them.
Inasmuch as conceptual patterns are rationally derived from the abstraction and synthesis
of experiences, the fundamental incongruities are between the bare system of rationality
we use to make sense of the world and experiences that seem like they should—but
ultimately don't—fit neatly into that system. For a joke to be funny, it seems, it must not
only present an incongruity, but must present an incongruity that at first blush doesn't
entirely appear to be incongruous. It has been shown time and time again that the mere
presence or perception of an incongruity can be funny, but is not sufficient for the
perception of humor. It is fair to say that some oddball jokes are amusing simply in virtue
of their absurdity ("How many surrealist painters does it take to screw in a lightbulb?"
"Fish."), but the jokes we find the most amusing always seem to present an incongruity in
such a way that the incongruity is not immediately apparent. In slightly different terms,
we are especially amused by incongruities created by processes—behavioral or
intellectual—that seem, in some sense, reasonable or rational. The joke about the hunters
discussed in Chapter 3 is a wonderful example of such a joke. As I suggested, the joke
would remain incongruous if the hunter, instead of shooting his friend, did something
completely unexpected and absurd like hanging up the phone, sprouting wings, and flying
to Canada. This punch-line, however, would not make for a particularly funny joke. It is
funny precisely because the incongruous object in the joke is the product of fallacious
reasoning that has the appearance, however briefly, of being sound.
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Here is another (very famous) example of a joke that exploits the potential failure
of inductive reasoning (though misarticulated in the story as deductive reasoning!) to
generate amusement.
Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson are on a camping trip in the English
countryside. They pitch their tent under the stars, eat their dinner and go to sleep.
Around 3 a.m. Holmes wakes Watson with a light nudge and asks:
"Watson, look up at the sky and tell me what you see."
Watson pauses for a moment, thinking, then answers: "I see millions and
millions of stars."
Holmes says: "And what do you deduce from that?"
“Well,” Watson says, “Astronomically, it tells me that there are millions
of galaxies and potentially billions of planets. Astrologically, I observe that
Saturn is in Leo. Horologically, I deduce that the time is approximately a quarter
past three. Meteorologically, I suspect that we will have a beautiful day
tomorrow. Theologically, I see that God is all-powerful, and we are small and
insignificant. Why do you ask, Holmes?"
"Watson, you idiot, it means that somebody stole our tent."
Watson's musings in this joke are rational inductions based on his observations
and it could even be said that all his conclusions are in fact correct. But in spite of his
observational prowess, Watson fails to notice one incredibly relevant feature of his
environment, namely that the tent he went to sleep in is missing. His reasoning is sound,
but fails to bring him to an appropriate conclusion. He doesn't pay attention to the fact
that he is only able to make his inductions from the stars' positions because his tent is
missing. There is an incongruity between Watson's reasoning, which is sound and leads
to technically correct conclusions, and the fact that in this particular case his rational
process leads him away from the practical information he needs to acquire.
Schopenhauer, it seems, is interested in and aware of the gap between abstract
reason and perceptions of the actual. He writes that, "although abstract rational
knowledge...is founded on [ideas of perception], it is by no means in such entire
congruity with them that it could everywhere take their place: indeed it never corresponds
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to them quite accurately" (WWI I, §13). This, in fact, is the foundation for his theory of
laughter, which is situated as a part of his larger metaphysics. This persistent lack of
congruity between abstract rational knowledge and actual experiences is really at the
heart of any formulation of incongruity theory. When we perceive humor we are
perceiving an incongruity between an actual experience and our conceptual model for
that kind of experience. Some such incongruities seem to exist between experience and
rationality indirectly, as incongruities between experiences and rationally derived
conceptual patterns. Others, like the jokes above, seem to present incongruities between
experience and reason itself.
Ted Cohen (1999) argues that a great deal of traditional Jewish humor is
constructed by highlighting incongruities between rationality and actual experiences.
Describing such jokes, Cohen writes, "They all display a crazy logic. They have an
insane rationality, a logical rigor gone over the edge" (46). Take this example:
A poor Jewish man stopped at the house of a rich Jewish man to
ask for a handout.
“I don’t just give away money,” declared the rich man, “but I have
a Gentile who mows my lawn and I pay him $20. You mow my lawn and
I’ll pay you $25.”
“Let the Gentile keep the job,” says the poor Jew. “Just give me
the $5.” (49)
As Cohen points out, there is something incredibly rational about the poor man's
request in this joke in spite of the fact that his reasoning brings him to a conclusion that
seems, in some respects, quite ludicrous. Though it seems like there must be a mistake in
his reasoning, the flaw is somewhat difficult to identify. This may be because, in fact,
there is no serious problem with the poor man's reasoning, it is merely that his rationally
arrived at conclusion is incongruous with our beliefs about the importance earning the
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money that we receive. Additionally, the conventional thinking (at least in capitalist
ideology) is that the poor man ought to eagerly accept $25 in exchange for work rather
than $5 for nothing. The rich man says he never gives out charity, but he is willing to
give the poor Jewish man $5 more than the Gentile for no reason other than their shared
faith. It is, essentially, charity. When the poor Jew just asks for the five extra dollars he
exposes something irrational about the rich Jew's attitudes and beliefs about charity and
earning money. This joke highlights an incongruity between our faith in, and reliance on,
logic and the fact that our behavior often fails to adhere strictly to rationality.
I am particularly fond of this humorous anecdote, reproduced by Cohen (1999),
which parodies the kind of hardcore logic often employed by Talmudic scholars.
A young man applies to study with a Talmudic scholar. The scholar rejects him,
saying, “Before you can study Talmud, you must know Jewish logic.”
“But I already know logic,” protests the student, “Aristotelian syllogisms,
truth-functional logic, predicate logic, set theory, everything.”
“That’s not Jewish logic,” replies the scholar, but the student persists, and
so the scholar offers to give him a test to determine whether he is prepared.
“Here is the question,” says the scholar. “Two men go down a chimney.
One has a dirty face, one has a clean face. Which one washes?”
“That’s easy,” says the student, “the one with the dirty face.”
“Wrong,” says the scholar. “The one with the clean face looks at the other
one, sees a dirty face, and thinks his must also be dirty, and so the one with the
clean face washes.”
“I see,” says the student. “It is a little more complicated than I thought,
but I can do this. Please test me again.”
“All right,” sighs the scholar. “Here is the question. Two men go down a
chimney. One has a dirty face, one has a clean face. Which one washes?”
In surprise the student answers, “Just as you said, the one with the clean
face washes.”
“Wrong,” says the scholar. “The one with the dirty face observes his
companion looking at him and making ready to wash his face. ‘Ah ha,’ he thinks.
‘He must see a dirty face, and it’s mine.’ And so the one with the dirty face
washes.”
“It is even more complicated than I yet realized,” says the student, “but
now I do understand. Please test me once more.”
“Just once more,” says the scholar. “Here is the question. Two men go
down a chimney. One has a dirty face, one has a clean face. Which one washes?”
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“Now I know the answer,” says the student. “The one with the dirty face
washes, just as I thought in the beginning, but for a different reason.”
“Wrong,” says the scholar. “If two men go down a chimney, how can only
one have a dirty face? Go and study. When you know Jewish logic, come back.”
(Cohen, 65)
This story is funny because it presents, once again, an incongruity between
abstract reason and individual experiences that somehow refuse to be described
appropriately by reason. This particular joke, however, contains an insightful truth within
its humor, namely that no matter how soundly and logically one tries to reason their way
through a problem, the universe can be irrational. Sometimes, as in this story, the
appropriate response to the problem is to inquire about the premises. After all, if two men
go down a chimney how could only one have a dirty face? In this sense this story is
similar to the Sherlock joke above because both examples demonstrate the practical
futility of reason if the peculiarities and irrationalities of the perceived world are
unaccounted for.
My suggestion here is that Schopenhauer is right to assert a fundamental
incongruity between reason in the abstract and the particular experiences that constitute
day-to-day life. We use reason to extrapolate from our experiences to conceptual patterns
and models of how the world works. These conceptual models are necessarily
incongruent with some of our experiences because the world itself is not governed wholly
by reason and no abstract concept can adequately describe the innumerable shades of
nuance that characterize worldly experience. There is an incongruity fundamental to the
human experience between the rational, conceptually ideal world, and the flawed,
sometimes irrational reality of the world we inhabit and, perhaps more strikingly, the
irrationality of human behavior. This particular incongruity is the operational incongruity
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at the foundation of a great deal of humor. When we laugh at intellectual or moral
ineptitude, when we laugh at miscommunications or linguistic ambiguity, when we laugh
at absurdities, it is because we are amused by the failure of our actual experiences to live
up to the rationally derived, conceptual ideals we have created; just as the comic cannot
exist in a world defined by chaos, it is equally impossible in a perfectly rational world. As
Baudelaire writes, "the Incarnate World was never known to laugh, for Him who knows
all things, whose powers are infinite, the comic does not exist" (Morreall, "Taking
Laughter Seriously", 126).
There is, I believe, a brand of comedy which, in addition to being quite popular,
takes direct advantage of the incongruity between the human aspiration towards
rationality and the persistent and inevitable human failure to achieve such a state. This
kind of humor delights in pointing out the cosmic irrationality of the beliefs, goals, and
traditions that we hold dear, and in some cases as sacred. Take, for instance, this Jerry
Seinfeld routine, which exemplifies this type of comedy:
We don’t understand death. And the proof of this is that we give dead people a
pillow. I mean, I think if you can’t stretch out and get some solid rest at that point,
I don’t see how bedding accessories really make the difference. They've got the
guy in a suit with a pillow. Now, is he going to a meeting, or is he catching forty
winks? I mean, let’s make up our mind where we think they’re going. (The Pony
Remark)
This piece of stand-up comedy perfectly articulates the incongruities between the
absolute unjustifiability of so many widely-held and unquestioned beliefs and the fact
that we hold them nonetheless. In a related routine, Seinfeld riffs on a survey finding that
reports Americans' number one fear to be public speaking and Americans' number two
fear to be death. Which means, as Seinfeld points out, "for most people, if you're ever at a
funeral, you'd rather be in the casket than giving the eulogy" (The Pilot pt. 1). Once
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again, the humor in this quip is derived from highlighting the irrationality of human
behavior and implicitly contrasting it with the rational purity we hold up as an abstract
ideal.
It is not a coincidence that these jokes are both about death, an event that unites us
in its inevitability. In his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Kant shows that the answers to
many persistent metaphysical problems like those about the nature of death are
unattainable through the use of pure reason. It is impossible, on his account, for us to
have justifiable knowledge of things beyond the realm of experience. In the wake of the
Kantian critique, we are struck, and at times frustrated, by the impotence of rational
inquiry into questions about the nature of death, the purpose of existence, the existence of
god. Interestingly enough, however, these are topics about which a great many people
hold very serious beliefs. This inability to satisfactorily confirm or disconfirm our beliefs
or even our conjectures about the realm beyond our experience, perhaps, is the great
uncertainty of the human condition.
Thomas Nagel (1971) address this fundamental incongruity of human existence in
terms of what he calls 'philosophical absurdity', a close cousin of robust epistemological
skepticism. Though he doesn't frame his argument in terms of comedy, there is a
humorous aspect in his writing, highlighted perhaps by his use of the humor-term 'ironic'
to characterize life's potential meaninglessness. Nagel's suggestion is that "most people
feel on occasion that life is absurd, and some feel it vividly and continually" (716). He
dismisses arguments in support of this intuition based both on the temporal or spatial
insignificance of humanity in the cosmic scheme, and on the assertion that the
inevitability of death necessitates that all chains of justification for any given action be
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broken, as inadequate. He argues instead that our sense of life's absurdity comes from, "a
collision of the seriousness with which we take our lives and the perpetual possibility of
regarding everything about which we are serious as arbitrary, or open to doubt...[Life] is
absurd because we ignore the doubts that we know cannot be settled, continuing to live
with nearly undiminished seriousness in spite of them" (719). This collision culminates,
according to Nagel, not in failing to find some next link in the chain of justification
supporting our actions (i.e. being unable to explain why we do anything), but in failing to
find justification for the very system we use to evaluate, justify, and critique. "We step
back to find that the whole system of justification and criticism, which controls our
choices and supports our claims to rationality, rests on responses and habits that we never
question, that we should not know how to defend without circularity, and to which we
shall continue to adhere even after they are called into question" (720).
So beyond the fundamental incongruity outlined above (between the rational ideal
and the flawed real), lies a deeper internal incongruity within reason itself, occasioned by
our faith in rationality as an adequate (if not perfect) system of justification for
everything we believe, think, and do. The incongruity lies in the single exception to
rationality's scope as a system of justification: we cannot use rationality to justify our
faith in rationality as a system of justification without circularity (720). Of course, as
Nagel points out, what is remarkable about humanity in general is our capability to step
back and acknowledge the very real possibility that everything we take seriously is
arbitrary and then return to our (possibly meaningless) lives with as much sincerity as
ever.
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It is my contention that by situating the philosophical absurdity outlined by Nagel
as a humorous incongruity, it is possible to understand the potential unjustifiability of all
our convictions and beliefs (as long as we don't find the possibility too emotionally
taxing) as comic in and of itself in addition to serving as the operational incongruity at
the core of many kinds of humor. It would seem that if anything should be justifiable, the
system we use to justify our actions and beliefs ought to be, but it isn't.
Here is a good example of a joke that highlights the way in which we provide
ourselves with faulty justifications for the things that we believe but can't be sure of.
Atheists and the devoutly religious are both groups that tend to hold strong convictions
for which they can offer little to no definitive proof. This joke pokes fun at the lengths
people are willing to go to find supporting evidence for their convictions.
A little old Christian lady comes out onto her front porch every morning and
shouts, “Praise the Lord!” And every morning the atheist next door yells back,
"There is no God!” This goes on for weeks.
“Praise the Lord!” yells the lady.
“There is no God!” responds the neighbor.
As time goes by, the lady runs into financial difficulties and has trouble buying
food. She goes out onto the porch and asks God for help with groceries, then says,
“Praise the Lord!”
The next morning when she goes out onto the porch, there are the
groceries she asked for. Of course, she shouts,
“ Praise the Lord!” The atheist jumps out from behind a bush and says,
“Ha! I bought those groceries. There is no God!” The lady looks at him
and smiles. Turning her face to heavens, she shouts,
“Praise the Lord! Not only did you provide for me, Lord, you made Satan
pay for the groceries!” (Cathcart, Klein, 99).
This joke is amusing because it highlights the futility of arguing 'rationally' over an
irresolvable dispute; neither party will ever be convinced by the other. Nevertheless we
engage in these kinds of arguments all the time and can easily imagine the scene depicted
in this joke unfolding in real life. The seriousness with which these bickering neighbors
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fight is incongruous with the fundamental truth that neither can be sure of their own
position let alone successfully convince the other. George Carlin told a famous joke that
is funny for similar reasons: "Tell people an invisible man in the sky created all things,
they believe you. Tell them what you've painted is wet, they have to touch it to believe".
Again, the funniness of this joke comes from highlighting the incongruity between the
different epistemological standards some people use to evaluate the merit of their beliefs.
On the one hand, being told that God exists is enough for some people to believe, but
many of those same people want empirical verification before they believe the paint is
wet.
Chapter 6 - Conclusion
By this point I hope I have articulated clearly and thoroughly how incongruity
theory operates as an analytic tool for understanding the comic. Additionally, I have
shown incongruity theory's strength as an explanation for what gives a situation, object,
or event the potential to be perceived as amusing as well as identifying a significant
weakness in the account. Namely, that it provides an insufficient explanation for why a
given subject is amused by a given incongruous object when there are so many examples
of non-amusing incongruous perceptions. Though I do not claim to have solved this
problem in its entirety (I wonder if such a solution is attainable), it is my assertion that
the closer semblance a given incongruity bears to a non-incongruity, relative to a given
subject's conceptual schema, the greater is the likelihood that that subject will be amused.
Finally, I have discussed at some length the existence of a fundamental incongruity
between the rational foundation of our conceptual patterns, beliefs, and systems of
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justification, and the persistent possibility that, in fact, these beliefs and systems rest on a
foundation of assumptions.
Humorist Stephen Leacock wrote that the ultimate humor arises from, "the
incongruity between the eager fret of our life and its final nothingness" (Morreall,
"Taking Laughter Seriously", 124). There is, I believe a sense in which this is true. At the
conclusion of his piece, Nagel writes that, "if sub specie aeternitatis1, there is no reason
to believe that anything matters, then that doesn't matter either and we can approach our
absurd lives with irony instead of despair" (727). The ultimate incongruity of human
existence lies between zeal with which we believe in and trust in the rationality of the
universe and the uncomfortable truth that we'll never know if doing so is justified. Louis
C.K. employs this incongruity for the purposes of amusement in a particularly inspired
bit. In it, he describes having protracted conversations with his six year old daughter in
which she responds to every statement he makes with the question, "why?". He recounts
a particular example to illustrate his daughter's insatiable desire for answers and her
inability to accept anything. As he tries to explain (albeit somewhat tacitly), with
increasing exasperation, that at the bottom of everything there is no satisfying answer to
the fundamental why of existence, he highlights the incongruity outlined above. Though
the transcription doesn't quite do the bit justice, here is the routine:
"Poppa, why can't we go outside?"
"Because it's raining."
"Why?"
"Well, water's coming out of the sky."
"Why?"
"Because it was in a cloud."
"Why?"
"Because clouds form when there's ... I don't know, vapor."
1

'under the aspect of eternity',
60

"Why?"
"I don't know, I don't know any more things, those are all the things I
know!"
"Why?"
"Because I'm stupid, OK? I'm stupid."
"Why?"
"Because I didn't pay attention in school! I went to school but I didn't
listen in class."
"Why?"
"Because I was high all the time, I smoked too much pot!"
"Why?"
"Because my parents gave me no guidance, they didn't give a shit!"
"Why?"
"Because they fucked in a car and had me and they resented me for taking
their youth."
"Why?"
"Because they had bad morals, they just had no compass..."
"Why?"
"Because they had shitty parents, it just goes on and on like that!"
"Why?"
"Because, fuck it, we're alone in the universe! Nobody gives a shit about
us!"
I'm going to stop here to be polite to you for a second, but this just goes on and on
for hours and hours and it gets so weird and abstract... it's like:
"Why?
"Because some things are and some things are not!"
"Why?"
"Well because things that are not can't be!"
"Why?"
"Because then nothing wouldn't be! You can't have fuckin' nothing isn't!
And everything is!"
"Why?"
"Because if nothing wasn't then there'd be fuckin' all kinds of shit that we
don't... like giant ants with top hats dancing around. There's no room for all that
stuff"
"Why?"
"Oh fuck you, eat your french-fries you little shit, goddammit!"
With comic brilliance this routine makes us laugh at the incongruity between the
systems that we rely on and trust in and the fact that we don't truly understand any of
them. Even if you know how rain forms or how particles interact there eventually comes
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a why that is unanswerable. It doesn't usually leave us stammering that, "you can't have
nothing isn't because things that aren't not can't be!" but C.K.'s parody of the dissolution
of rational inquiry when confronted with metaphysical issues beyond the realm of
experience is striking both in its funniness and for the philosophical wisdom lurking
beneath its surface. We can and will most likely continue to demand explanations from
the world around us, but at no point will we be satisfied with the answers. Hume (1984)
writes of investigating these issues that, "Fortunately...since reason is incapable of
dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose and cures me of this
philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterates these chimeras...And
when after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they
appear so cold and strain'd and ridiculous that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them
any farther" (316). Amusement at the incongruity of life gives us a chance to take a
breath and temporarily remove ourselves from the struggle to find meaning. In doing so
we realize that sometimes its OK to shut up and eat our french-fries.
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